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Abstract: We investigate whether banking crises affect individuals’ subjective wellbeing 
(SWB) in eighteen European countries between 1980-2011. We address the potential 
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banking crises episodes. We find negative, robust, pronounced and highly persistent effects for 
events prior to 2007. The 2007-2008 crash lowered SWB in countries that had previously 
experienced a credit boom. Individuals living in regions hosting financial centres suffer bigger 
losses. Yet, the impact is similar across socio-demographic groups. These effects extend 
beyond changes in macroeconomic factors, wealth and fiscal policies: they are hidden 
psychological costs.  
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1. Introduction 
Economists generally agree that the ultimate goal of economic policy is to maximise the 
population’s welfare. Welfare can be measured by the quantity and quality of goods and 
services that people enjoy, which are particularly related to income, wealth and job status 
changes. A financial crisis can shock this economic welfare system by imposing considerable 
burdens both on economies and individuals. There is an extensive literature on the channels 
through which these crises impact the real economy via credit disruption, wealth and output 
losses (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Cecchetti et al., 2009).1 When compared to all other types of 
financial crises, banking crises are distinctive in that they independently affect the whole 
economic system and have both direct and indirect impacts on individuals. In addition to these 
traditional impacts, there are more subtle consequences of banking crises. For example, 
banking crises can erode the fundamental trust on which the entire financial system is based and 
the deterioration of the confidence necessary for investment and consumption (Zingales, 2011). 
Banking crises, therefore, generally increase the overall level of uncertainty (Dow, 2012). 
Deaton (2011), looking at the United States, suggests that the 2008 financial crisis was the 
driver of a general decline in mental health as measured by subjective well-being (SWB 
hereafter).2 
In this paper, our investigation of the effects of banking crises on SWB uses a larger 
cross-country dataset over a longer time period than that used by previous researchers. 
Typically, SWB data comes from longitudinal or cross-country surveys in which respondents 
are asked to evaluate their life overall or their happiness on a given scale.3 In studies conducted 
by psychologists, sociologists and economists, SWB is typically found to be correlated with 
micro and macro-economic factors (e.g., income, job status, unemployment rate) in a 
predictable fashion (for reviews see Frey and Stutzer, 2002; MacKerron, 2012). 4  The 
conclusions of Di Tella et al. (2001 and 2003) are particularly relevant to us; they were the first 
1 In addition to this, economic downturns and other pronounced financial events have been found to have long-lasting 
economic consequences. For instance, corporate managers born during the U.S. Great Depression of the 1930s are less likely to 
use external financing (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), high leverage (Graham and Narasimham, 2004) and are more risk averse 
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). 
2 See also Askitas and Zimmermann (2011). 
3 SWB, happiness and life satisfaction are used interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.  
4 SWB data contributed to moving forward the empirical study of interdependence of preferences that can be traced back to 
Veblen (1973) and Duesenberry (1949). Happiness is relative because individuals tend to compare their present and past 
incomes; they adapt to new and higher levels of income and update their aspirations (e.g., Stutzer, 2004); and they compare 
themselves to their peers – deriving disutility from other people’s income (e.g., Luttmer, 2005; Card et al., 2012). 
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to show a negative association between recessions and SWB across Europe.  
Conclusions from this paper help bridge the gap in research on the costs of banking crises 
and that on SWB by estimating these costs in terms of loss of life satisfaction using European 
data. We address the potential endogeneity of banking crises and study their persistence in the 
economy. We require, therefore, (a) a definition of banking crises that can discriminate 
between crises that impact the population as a whole (not just shareholders or big investors), 
and (b) a clear identification of the effects of banking crises.  
Defining a variable that fully captures the intensity of banking crises is a problematic task. 
Such crises are complex events and proxies might be imperfectly correlated with the crises 
themselves (see e.g., Barrell et al., 2010a).5 The literature on financial stability and costs of 
banking crises has resolved this issue by constructing event dummies based on several criteria 
that vary slightly according to the study. Establishing our own definition goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, therefore, we adopt this approach and utilize the databases compiled by Bordo et 
al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2003), Jonung and Hagberg (2005), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), and recently updated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Although different 
definitions of a banking crisis are adopted in these databases, there is substantial agreement 
among these definitions regarding the episodes that occurred during our period of interest 
across Europe. We focus our attention on crises where commercial banks were involved, hence, 
excluding those events in which only merchant banks are involved. We do this because the 
outcome variable is the well-being of the whole population rather than some macroeconomic or 
financial outcome.6  
We then match this data to individual SWB data from the Eurobarometer surveys covering 
eighteen European countries for the period 1980-2011. Our final dataset includes sixteen 
episodes of banking crises that can be categorized as borderline systemic crises. Five of these 
occurred before the 2007-2008 financial crisis in different countries at different times. 
We start the analysis by running OLS regressions of individual SWB on banking crises 
controlling for country and year fixed effects (and typical micro and macro variables). The 
coefficient on the banking crisis can be interpreted causally only under the assumption of 
unconfoundedness (see e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Establishing causality between 
5 Section 4.2 provides a detailed explanation. 
6 It is worth noting that macroeconomic conditions have an impact on the individuals’ SWB, particularly, but not exclusively, if 
these conditions are determinants of change in job status. Inflation and unemployment rates are often found to be negatively 
related to individual life satisfaction, even after controlling for individual characteristics (see e.g., Blanchflower et al., 2014; Di 
Tella et al., 2001 and 2003; Wolfers, 2003). In our empirical specification, we do control for such a scenario; nevertheless our 
focus is on effects that go above and beyond these standard macroeconomic channels. 
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macroeconomic events and well-being (both subjective and objective) is challenging. In this 
particular case, financial crises might be endogenous to SWB because of simultaneous and 
omitted factors that could be correlated with SWB and the year of the crisis. Therefore, even 
when using a large array of micro and macro controls, OLS happiness regressions potentially 
result in biased coefficients. In order to improve upon this, we take advantage of the spatial and 
temporal variation of crises in our European dataset. This approach can be thought of as a 
(dynamic) difference-in-differences (henceforth DD) strategy. Specifically, we compare the 
SWB of individuals living in European countries before and after a banking crisis (i.e., multiple 
treatment groups), with individuals living in countries that, in the same period, do not 
experience a banking crisis (i.e., multiple control groups). The identifying assumption is that 
the SWB of individuals living in countries that did not experience a crisis form a valid 
counterfactual for the SWB of individuals living in treatment countries (after conditioning on 
micro and macro characteristics, country and year fixed effects). We check this assumption by 
allowing for leads and lags of the banking crisis effects. Statistically similar trends before the 
crisis suggest the absence of differential trends between treatment and control groups prior to 
the crisis.7  
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, we show that OLS and dynamic DD 
estimates are very similar in most cases. If anything, DD estimates show slightly larger 
coefficients suggesting that OLS estimates might be downward-biased. 
Second, banking crises, in general, have a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
SWB of Europeans; however, we are able to establish causality for the episodes prior to the 
2007-2008 financial crash and SWB. For these events, we show that the psychological losses 
are highly persistent –lasting about four years from the onset of the crisis. These losses not only 
extend beyond the conventional macroeconomic controls (GDP, unemployment and inflation 
rates), but also beyond wealth losses and fiscal costs which might be associated with a banking 
crisis resolution. The estimated parameters are also relatively large. The loss in SWB brought 
about by the crisis during the first year is equivalent to an increase in the unemployment rate of 
ten percentage points. This may seem large, but because we are controlling for job status, the 
coefficient on the unemployment rate is likely to capture additional factors, such as the fear of 
being unemployed, rather than actual unemployment per se (see e.g., Di Tella et al., 2001; 
Blanchflower, 1991; Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009). We also compute the trade-off 
between income and the banking crisis that will leave people, on average, with the same level of 
7 For simplicity we will refer to these as dynamic DD estimates in the remainder of the paper. 
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SWB. We estimate that during the first year of the banking crisis, individuals would require an 
increase in income equivalent to moving from the first to the second income quartile to offset 
the decline in SWB.  
Third, although we estimate a negative coefficient for the 2007-8 crash, this is not 
statistically significant at the usual level of confidence. One explanation is that the episode was 
so severe and complex that it involved every country in our sample including the ones that 
technically did not suffer from a banking crisis. The data seem to support this hypothesis. We 
uncover two important facts related to the great recession: a) utilizing a triple DD we shows that 
the loss in SWB is sizeable for those countries that had previously experienced a credit boom 
and b) by means of an event study, we document that for the majority of the countries there is a 
negative trend in SWB starting about three years before the crisis. 
Fourth, we study whether banking crises impact more heavily on some socio-economic 
groups. We do this by interacting banking crisis indicators with individuals’ socio-economic 
characteristics. Overall, the results suggest that banking crises do not appear to have a different 
impact across groups. When the difference is statistically significant, the impact is not 
persistent over time. 
Fifth, we find that banking crisis episodes hurt more individuals living in regions which 
host financial centres than statistically comparable individuals living in the rest of the country. 
This holds for the latest financial crisis too. 
We interpret the decline in SWB as hidden costs associated with individuals’ psychological 
distress caused by increased uncertainty and lack of trust brought about by the disruption of the 
banking systems. This interpretation would be mistaken (and the effect biased) if our DD 
estimator picks up concomitant events at the country-year level. We think this is unlikely as 
every specification controls for a variety of time-varying factors at the country level. However, 
the interpretation is also confirmed by a falsification test, in which an indicator of recession 
(years of negative growth in this case) instead of banking crisis as treatment, does not yield 
similar results. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the previous 
literature on the costs of financial, especially banking crises, and the channels through which 
banking crises impact well-being. Section 3 highlights the empirical strategy. Section 4 focuses 
on the data sets. Section 5 contains the results and in Section 6 we offer our conclusions. 
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2. The costs of banking crises 
Extensive research has been carried out to investigate the channels through which financial 
crises, and in particular banking crises, propagate through to the real economy. Hutchison and 
Noy (2005), for example, argue that banking crises may have adverse effects on economic 
output by disrupting the process of credit intermediation; this disruption imposes both direct 
and indirect costs on the economy as a whole or on parts of it. Cerra and Saxena (2008), 
employing panel data from 192 countries, find strong evidence of a large reduction in economic 
output. Similar evidence is provided by Cecchetti et al. (2009); looking at 40 crises since 1980, 
their results show sharp and persistent contractions in output. Hoggarth et al. (2002) suggest 
that output loss is about 15-20% of annual GDP, on average. More recently, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009a; 2009b and 2011), using a sample that spans centuries and several countries, 
show that banking crises have a long-lasting effect on both real economic activity and asset 
prices. Notably, unemployment rises, on average, for five years with an average rate of seven 
percentage points. Real GDP per capita falls by an average of about nine per cent, and the 
duration of the economic downturn is two years. Housing and equity markets are severely hit; 
the decline is about 35% and 56%, respectively. Barrell et al. (2006) show that banking crises 
have a non-negligible effect on consumption, particularly in the presence of high leverage.  
The recent availability of richer longitudinal household surveys has prompted researchers 
to attempt to quantify the microeconomic costs of financial crises. Particular emphasis has been 
placed on the consequence of the recent financial crisis. Bricker et al. (2011) conclude that 60% 
of U.S. households experienced a decline in wealth between 2007 and 2009, and that about 25% 
of them lost more than half of their wealth. Chakrabarti et al. (2011) and Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2010) show how these losses have affected large numbers of households across all age, 
income, and education brackets. Bosworth and Smart (2009) calculate that this loss was about 
20% for households aged over 50. Financial losses were associated with reductions in 
consumption, and many households reduced consumption even without experiencing financial 
losses (e.g. Christelis et al., 2011; Shapiro, 2010). 
In addition to these conventional welfare losses discussed in the macroeconomic literature, 
financial crises and economic recessions in general, impose costs that are more difficult to 
measure but are nevertheless important. These intangible, hidden economic disruptions are 
linked to a decrease in individuals’ mental well-being resulting from increased uncertainty, fear 
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of becoming unemployed and a decline in trust of the economic system (Deaton, 2011).8  
Gathergood (2012), using longitudinal data from the UK, finds that problems with mortgage 
debt affect individuals’ mental well-being.  
Banking crises strongly affect the mutual level of confidence and trust between firms, 
households and banks. Any lack of confidence created by financial crises generates a higher 
system uncertainty which will ultimately have a negatively impact the level of consumption 
and investment and more generally on individuals’ well-being. The importance of uncertainty 
in the economic system cannot be over-emphasized; uncertainty is intrinsic to every 
transaction.9 A banking crisis involves a deep failure of trust and an increase in uncertainty: 
uncertainty about the borrowers’ ability to repay the lender; uncertainty that commercial banks 
will be able to provide liquidity on demand; uncertainty that the central bank will provide all 
the liquidity necessary to the commercial banks once it has set the interest rate; and uncertainty 
about the long term consequences of government finances. Related to this, Zingales (2011) 
shows a strong relation between the trust that respondents place in banks and their willingness 
to keep savings in the form of bank deposits.  
The next section provides details on how this paper estimates these well-being losses using 
individual SWB data. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
In this paper, we estimate the effects of banking crises on SWB across European countries. The 
central feature of the methodology employed is the use of individual-level data (repeated 
cross-section surveys) to compare the experience of individuals that live in countries hit by a 
banking crisis to a similar but unaffected group. 
The (indirect) well-being function (𝑊) can be described as: 
 
𝑊 =  𝑓(𝒁,𝑿) (1) 
 
 
where Z is a set of demographic and personal characteristics, including income, and X is a set of 
macroeconomic controls to account for country-specific, time-varying factors (e.g., generic 
8 Conversely, bad times seem to improve physical health (for a review see Ruhm, 2006) 
9 In support of this notion, the data show that bank deposits in the UK make up more than 90 per cent of all money used in the 
economy. A reliance on mutual trust may well be the best mechanism to deal with this unquantifiable level of risk. “In a crisis 
situation, uncertainty increases as the range of possible outcomes increases and as awareness increases of the extent of potential 
‘unknown unknowns’ which cannot feasibly be incorporated into calculations.” (Dow, 2012, p. 3). 
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business cycle influences).  
The happiness economics literature estimates functions like 𝑊  directly by employing 
subjective well-being data (e.g., life satisfaction or happiness scores) as a proxy for 𝑊. This 
approach has been used extensively in economics in recent years. It has been applied 
successfully in the study of attributes linked to experienced utility and in the assessment of 
psychological losses associated with socio-demographic and economic (e.g., Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006). According to this framework, a well-being 
function such as equation (1) can be estimated by regressing individual scores of SWB on a 
variety of individual, economic, demographic and social variables. The implicit assumption is 
that self-reported happiness is a good proxy for underlying true well-being, experience utility or 
mental health. A number of studies support the use of SWB; self-reported happiness or life 
satisfaction strongly correlates with life events, physical measures and objective circumstances 
in a predictable way.10 We find this approach very convincing as indicated by the consistency 
of findings across different datasets and different countries.11 
Some studies examine the relationship between macroeconomic events and individual 
SWB. The seminal papers by Di Tella et al. (2001 and 2003), for example, show that SWB 
decreases when the unemployment rate and inflation increase (see also Welsch, 2010 and 
Blanchflower et al., 2014).12 This research unequivocally shows contemporaneous movements 
of SWB with macroeconomic measures, but, so far, has not successfully identified clear causal 
links.  
One of the contributions of our paper is a simple framework to establish causality between 
macroeconomic events and SWB. The (average) effects of a banking crisis can be written in 
terms of potential outcomes and treatment effects as follows: 
 
𝜉(𝐷 = 1, 𝐽 = 1) = 𝐸[𝑊1 |𝐷 = 1, 𝐽 = 1,𝒁,𝑿] − [𝑊0 |𝐷 = 1, 𝐽 = 1,𝒁,𝑿]. (2) 
 
10 For example, happiness or life satisfaction are associated with the duration of an authentic smile, which involves involuntary 
contraction of the muscles surrounding the eyeball (the so-called “Duchenne smile” Ekman et al., 1990), blood pressure and 
heart rate (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008a), prefrontal brain activity (e.g., Davidson, 2004) and disability (Oswald and 
Powdthavee, 2008).  
11 There is a vast literature studying a variety of determinants of SWB in countries such as USA, Germany, Britain, Australia, 
Japan, Korea, South Africa, and most recently China. Regional and Worldwide surveys also exist (Eurobarometer Surveys, 
European Social Surveys, Latinobarometer Surveys, Gallup World Poll and World Values Surveys to cite the most common). 
Life satisfaction is typically found to be positively correlated with income – however, the relationship is curvilinear with richer 
individuals deriving less happiness than poorer individuals (e.g., Clark et al., 2008a) even within twins (Li et al., 2013). Being 
unemployed decreases SWB (e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Daly and Delaney, 2013), while being married is 
positively associated with it (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). Across a variety of datasets, SWB is also found to be 
U-shaped with respect to age (see e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008b; Wunder et al., 2013). 
12 Wolfers (2003) found that volatility, and therefore macroeconomic uncertainty, plays a role too. Unemployment volatility 
has a pronounced impact on well-being; interestingly, the effects of inflation volatility on well-being are less evident. 
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 𝑊1  and 𝑊0  are potential well-being outcomes with and without the banking crisis, 
respectively. The banking crisis is identified by 𝐷  and 𝐽 , binary crisis-year and country 
indicators, respectively. The term 𝜉(𝐷 = 1, 𝐽 = 1) represents the average treatment effect on 
the treated, i.e., the mean of these treatments effects across those individuals living in country 𝐽 
after a crisis hit. Z and X are defined as above. The effect of the crisis can then be estimated by 
running SWB regressions on the country-year of the crisis. Implementation of this method is 
complicated by the presence of simultaneous or omitted factors at country-year level that are 
not observed by the researcher but do correlate with the year of the crisis. The specifications we 
use in this paper include (a) typical OLS happiness regressions on banking crises and (b) a 
dynamic DD estimator. In what follows, we briefly review the econometric theory behind each 
of these approaches. The analysis will then study whether these psychological costs extend 
beyond economic losses typically associated with financial crises (e.g., income, job status, 
wealth). Furthermore, we compare banking crises to more general economic crises; this will 
serve to establish whether the effects arise from banking crises rather than from general 
economic downturns. Finally, we investigate the impact of crises on different 
socio-demographic groups and, for the latest crisis, on countries that experience a credit boom.  
Following Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), and more generally Angrist and Pischke 
(2008), we estimate all our regressions using linear probability models.13 In all specifications, 
we correct the standard errors using the two-way approach of Cameron et al. (2011) to account 
for correlation within country and year levels. We also estimated standard errors by clustering 
at country level as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). The two methods yield similar standard 
errors but we prefer the former as it performs better when the number of clusters is small.14 
3.1 The Basic Model 
We first investigate the relationship between SWB and banking crises using different 
specifications of conventional happiness regressions prior to establishing causality using a 
difference-in-differences framework. The baseline equation at the individual level is given by  
 
13 Angrist and Pischke (2008) show that the linear probability model is the best (linear) approximation for non-linear 
conditional expectation functions, whereas Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) demonstrate that the ordinal nature of 
happiness scores can be studied by using OLS with empirical examples. 
14 Results are available upon request. 
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𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑿𝑗𝑡𝜷 + 𝒁𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜸 + 𝜉𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
 
where 𝑖  indexes individuals, 𝑗  indexes nations, and 𝑡  indexes time. 𝜆𝑡  and 𝛼𝑗  are the year 
effects and the country fixed effects, respectively. 𝐷𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 for the year of a banking crisis and 0 otherwise, 𝒁𝑖𝑗𝑡  are individual-specific 
covariates, while 𝑿𝑗𝑡  accounts for macroeconomic variables that control for time-varying 
general characteristics at a country level. 
In this specification, the effect of a banking crisis is measured by the coefficient 𝜉. This 
parameter equates to the average treatment effect only under the assumptions of 
unconfoundedness (i.e., there are enough controls so that the banking crisis assignment is 
essentially randomised). A specific problem here is that the banking crisis might be correlated 
with 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  because of either omitted or simultaneous factors being correlated with both the 
timing of the banking crisis and life satisfaction at country-year level; for example, banking 
crises may occur in countries that are affected by higher or lower levels of optimism. Variables 
may be omitted from even the best dataset, especially at the macro level.  
3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
We now take into account the potential endogeneity bias arising when running simple 
happiness regressions by adopting a dynamic DD framework. The starting point of this 
approach is common to the model in equation (2): other things being equal, one would expect 
that individuals living in a country hit by a financial shock in year t (i.e., treatment group) are 
more affected than a comparable group of individuals living elsewhere after year t, i.e., after the 
banking crisis occurred. The identifying assumption is that variations in SWB between 
treatment and control groups would have the same trend after the banking crisis, if the banking 
crisis did not occur. In a DD setting, this is usually known as the common trend assumption and 
cannot be verified. However, a common trend in SWB between treatment and control groups 
before the banking crisis is satisfactory evidence to indicate that banking crises are indeed 
exogenous.15 A natural way to check for the applicability of the assumption is to allow for leads 
and lags of the treatment (i.e. the banking shock). The equation at the individual level is:  
 
15 The model is complicated by having multiple treatment groups and multiple periods (moreover, the same treatment group 
can receive the treatment more than once). 
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 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑿𝑗𝑡𝜷 + 𝒁𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜸 + � 𝜉𝑛𝑞
𝑛=−𝑚
𝐷𝑗𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑛) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4) 
 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝑗 indexes nations, and 𝑡 indexes time. 𝜆𝑡 and 𝛼𝑗 are the year and 
country effects, respectively; 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an individual specific error term. ∑ 𝜉𝑛
𝑞
𝑛=−𝑚 𝐷𝑗𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑘 +
𝑛) is the term of interest , where k is the time at which the treatment is being switched on. We 
then allow for 𝑚 leads and 𝑞 lags of the treatment effect. 𝜉𝑛 is the coefficient of interest on the 
𝑛th lag or lead. 𝜉0 is then the normalised year corresponding with the beginning of the crisis.  
This dynamic DD specification is then similar to equation (3) but augmented by leads 
(anticipatory) effects and lag effects. This approach enhances the analysis in two ways: first, 
lagged effects relax the implicit assumption, common to standard DD estimators, of constant 
treatment effects. The dynamic DD allows us a) to look at whether individual SWB varies over 
time after the banking crisis and b) to study the persistence of, and adaptation to, these effects 
over multiple periods.16 Second, the battery of 𝑚 leads provides evidence of the common trend 
assumption. If the controls and treatment groups are correctly separated, we would expect that 
all the coefficients leading to the introduction of the treatment are not statistically different 
from zero, 𝛽𝑛 = 0,𝑛 < 0. If the anticipatory effects are different from zero, then the future 
treatment would predict current outcomes, suggesting that banking crises may not be 
exogenous. Because there is one crisis every five years roughly, we present the results using 
four leads and lags when using the 1980-2003 sample (i.e., every year from 𝜉−4  through 𝜉+4). 
For the 2003-2011 sample, we adopt a model which uses every year from 𝜉−4 to 𝜉+2. In the last 
case, the reference category is the third and/or fourth lag (𝜉+3 and 𝜉+4, i.e., either 2010 or 
2011). 
4 Data 
4.1 Life satisfaction and individual characteristics 
Our main data source is the Eurobarometer Survey Series, a repeated cross-section survey in 
16 It is well known that happiness shocks are temporary, lasting a few years, after which adaptation is mostly completed in a 
variety of cases, including changes in income (Di Tella et al., 2010 and Gardner and Oswald, 2007), and changes in status, e.g., 
disability (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), marriage and divorce (e.g., Clark et al., 2008b and Frijters et al., 2011). 
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which a random sample of Europeans are asked a series of demographic and socio-economic 
questions, including one on life satisfaction. These are conducted twice a year on average and 
each survey consist of approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per country. 17  These 
interviews take place between March and October each year. Our sample covers the period 
1980 to 2011. The main question of interest is: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” Answers to the 
question can be split into four categories.   
In this paper, we use samples of individuals living in eighteen European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Iceland. 18 
We consider four different samples by including or excluding the latest banking crisis (i.e., 
the 2007-2008 financial crash). The first sample includes all individuals interviewed between 
1980 and 2003; this gives us 633,687 observations. We are interested in studying the effect of 
including and excluding income on our treatment effects since the income variable is dropped 
from the Eurobarometer surveys after 2003, but understanding the impact of income on the 
treatments’ SWB is important. Thus when personal income is included in the specification, the 
number reduces to 459,799; this is the second sample. The third sample includes 315,877 
observations from interviews after 2003 to 2011, i.e., just before and during the current 
financial crisis.19 Finally, our fourth sample includes all individuals who participated in the 
surveys from 1980 to 2011 (including the individuals who did not report income during all 
periods considered); this sample size is 933,943.  
The use of separate samples is beneficial: for instance, excluding the latest banking crisis 
from some of the analyses is necessary as the effect of the banking crisis may be confused with 
other macroeconomic shocks.20 
In summary, we have four sample periods that we will use for the analyses: 1) the period 
1980-2003, which includes individuals who reported their income; 2) the period 1980-2003 in 
which individuals’ income is excluded; 3) the period 2003-2011 (i.e., just before and after the 
2007-2008 financial crisis); 4) the whole period 1980-2011.  
17 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. 
18 Questions are not systematically asked in all countries each year, hence, technically this is an unbalanced panel of countries. 
In particular, we have the following years of data by country: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, UK (1980-2011); Germany (1992-2011) Austria, Finland, Sweden (1996-2011); Greece (1981-2011); Portugal, 
Spain (1986- 2011); Norway (1991-1993, 2001 and 2005); Iceland (2005, 2010-2011); Switzerland (2005) . 
19 The year 2003 is included in each of these three samples. Its exclusion does not affect the results. 
20 The Great Recession was initiated by a housing and banking crisis in the USA but it later developed into a sovereign debt 
crisis in Southern Europe. 
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Every regression includes a set of individual characteristics typically used in the literature: 
age, age-squared, dummy variables indicating gender, marital status (married, single, divorced 
or separated, widowed), educational attainment (i.e., age-left-school dummies), work status 
(employed, self-employed, unemployed), and whether retired, keeping house or a student.  
4.2 Banking crises 
The financial literature does not provide a single definition of a banking crisis. As explained in 
Barrell et al. (2010a, p. 3) “The problem lies in the fact that a banking crisis is an event, so 
proxies for banking crises would not necessarily be perfectly correlated with banking crises 
themselves”. If a quantitative candidate variable is found, it is usually not unique, is highly 
inconsistent and involves a degree of subjectivity (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). More specifically, banking problems can stem both 
from the liabilities and the assets sides of the banks’ balance sheets. In the former case, a 
measure for banking insolvency could be a good proxy; thus, even though a government 
intervention or deposit insurance schemes could prevent the crisis, the threshold could still be 
violated. However, when crises arise from banks’ assets, for instance, problems in asset quality 
eroding banking capital, a unique proxy would not pick up all the events across countries and 
across time.  
For this reason, several different databases compiled on the basis of various criteria, can be 
found in the financial literature.21 The two most recent and popular databases used are those of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013). Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
collected and updated data from a variety of sources, such as Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 
2003) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).22 Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, p. 1680), a 
banking crisis is marked “by two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, 
merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions [...]; and (2) if 
there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar 
outcomes for other financial institutions [...].” This definition is very similar to the one used by 
21 For instance, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) define a systemic crisis as an event when “all or most of the banking capital is 
exhausted”; their final database includes 93 countries. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identified 26 systemic banking crises 
over 20 countries during the period 1970-1995. The criteria adopted are similar to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998); a 
crisis is recorded if one of the following criteria is met: i) the ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets in the banking system 
exceeds 10 per cent; ii) the cost of the rescue operation is at least 2 per cent of GDP; iii) large scale nationalisation of banks; and 
iv) extensive bank runs or emergency measures were implemented by the Government in response to the banking crisis. 
22 The dataset accompanying the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) paper can be found at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.5.1676. The most recent updates of the database can be found here: 
http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/7/.  
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Laeven and Valencia (2010, p. 6), who define a banking crisis “as systemic if two conditions 
are met: 1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by 
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); 2) significant 
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.”  
Although this latter definition is very close to that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), it is far 
more restrictive since it excludes near-systemic crises, hence, there are very few episodes 
affecting our sample of countries. Moreover, there are several notable cases (Italy, 2008; 
Luxembourg, 2008; Sweden, 2008) wherein Laeven and Valencia (2013) report a crisis, 
whereas none are reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Furthermore, there is disagreement 
on the latest crisis for Ireland; Laeven and Valencia (2013), for example, date the start of the 
crisis in 2008 rather than 2007. In general, recent papers tend to agree with Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) (e.g., Borio and Drehmann, 2009).23 
Based on the discussion above, we adopt the dataset of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), and 
references therein. Because our paper is a study of hidden costs for the whole population using 
SWB, a close examination of two “minor” 1984 and 1995 UK crises leads us to exclude these 
events, since they were related to merchant banks which hold no deposits from the general 
public.24 Table A1 in the Appendix is drawn from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and describes 
every episode affecting our sample of 18 countries. A total of sixteen near-systemic banking 
crises were identified over the entire period.   
The next step is to map these episodes in the Eurobarometer Surveys. Since these surveys 
are not run every year for every country in our sample, we cannot merge life satisfaction data 
with 𝜉0 – the beginning of the crisis – for every episode. In particular, life satisfaction data are 
missing for the year of the crisis in five cases, namely, Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), Norway 
(1987), Iceland (2008) and Switzerland (2008). In all these cases, instead of dropping 
observations when running the dynamic DD model, we use information on life satisfaction data 
as leads or lags if the surveys were conducted in years leading up to or following the financial 
crisis. In particular, for Finland and Sweden, surveys are available only for year 𝜉+4, while for 
Norway only for 𝜉+3 and 𝜉+4. For Iceland, Eurobarometer surveys are available only for year 
𝜉+3  and 𝜉+4 , and year 𝜉−2 , while for Switzerland, the only Eurobarometer survey was 
conducted 3 years before its crisis (𝜉−3). Table 1 provides a snapshot of the countries for which 
we are able to merge life satisfaction data with the year 𝜉0. 
23 Investigating the latest financial crisis, Borio and Drehmann (2009) provide further evidence that a banking crisis did not 
occur in either Italy or Sweden. 
24 Results do not change substantially when including these two UK crises. 
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 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It is important to stress that crises vary in length, and, as reported in Cerra and Saxena 
(2008), the end of a crisis is never clearly defined. Our dynamic DD model is able to resolve 
this issue by estimating the immediate impact of the crisis as well as its persistence.25 
4.3 Macro controls 
Our dataset comprises a set of macroeconomic variables typically used to control for 
time-varying country effects and, in general, business cycle fluctuations. Data for 
unemployment, GDP and inflation are collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI). These data provide annual, PPP-adjusted per capita GDP figures. The PPP 
adjustments are based on the 2005 round of the International Comparisons Project, and all of 
our estimates are in 2005 international US dollars. When the WDI data are missing, we 
supplement them with data from the Penn World Tables and from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. 
Summary statistics of all the variables discussed in this Section can be found in Table 2. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
5 Results 
5.1 Basic Regressions 
We first investigate results from an OLS specification in which the effect of banking crises on 
SWB is estimated by regressing life satisfaction on a banking crisis dummy, and controlling for 
a set of micro and macro variables typically used in the literature (see equation (2)).26  
 
25 A similar approach, albeit in a time-series context and therefore without control groups, is adopted by Barrell et al. (2010b), 
who capture the long run impact of banking crises with dummies that take the value of 0 prior to the crisis and 1 from the time 
of the crisis onwards. 
26 For simplicity, we do not report the estimates of our numerous control variables. They are in line with previous research and 
do not differ at all from past studies which use the same data source. SWB is higher for female, married individuals and, among 
labour market status, for students; it is U-shaped in age; being unemployed is associated with lower SWB. Higher income 
groups report higher SWB. The macroeconomic variables have the usual sign, however they are not always statistically 
significant. These results are available upon request.   
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
There are two main conclusions that can be made from Table 3. Firstly, the sign on the 
variable of interest is negative and statistically significant at the usual level of confidence, only 
for the sample covering the period before the latest banking crisis. The absence of a statistically 
significant coefficient for the latest crisis comes as unexpected and bears further investigation: 
there are various plausible explanations, such as the ‘non-exclusivity’ of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, i.e., the crisis was extremely severe and developed simultaneously in all 
European and overseas countries. In the next sections we will examine this further. 
Overall, the results pre-2008 suggest a statistically-significant psychological cost 
associated with the year of the crisis itself. The first column in Table 3 indicates a stronger 
negative effect on well-being compared to the other columns. However, these columns are not 
fully comparable since the inclusion of income quartiles implies the (contemporaneous) 
exclusion of the latest crisis. This is due to the fact that surveys did not include income levels 
after 200327. If income losses are positively correlated with the banking crisis and SWB, then, 
the omission of income quartiles may lead to an overestimation of the effect of the banking 
crisis, However, the second column shows that the size of the banking crisis dummy is larger 
when income quartiles are controlled for (see the first column). Assuming that the same is true 
for the more recent financial event, a happiness regression estimation carried out without 
controlling for income quartiles – as we are forced to do due to data availability –represents a 
conservative estimate of the latest banking crisis.  
5.2. The hidden cost of banking crises  
The analysis indicates that there is a statistically significant correlation between SWB and the 
banking crisis, however it does not explicitly address the issue of causality. In order to resolve 
this we adopt a dynamic DD (see Section 3.2). Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of 
such a model.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Various interesting facts emerge from Table 4. First, the coefficients on the banking 
27 The income variable was not collected also for the year 1995. Effectively, when controlling for income, one is excluding the 
Great Recession from the analysis.  
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dummy variables are not significantly different from zero for all years before the crisis (i.e., 
there are no anticipated effects), indicating similar trends in SWB prior to the banking crisis in 
treatment and comparison groups. This supports the identifying assumption of the dynamic DD 
model. There is no statistically significant difference in SWB before the event either in 
countries affected by the crisis or in those that are not affected. We take this as an indication 
that countries spared from the crisis represent a good counterfactual. In other words, banking 
crises are exogenous shocks with respect to SWB. This is also shown in Figure 1 in which 
estimated coefficients from Table 4 are graphically reported with 90% confidence level.28  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Second, when we exclude the 2008 financial crisis, we find that banking crises have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the SWB of individuals across Europe: the magnitude 
of the coefficient  𝜉0, in absolute value, is 0.102 and significant at the 5% confidence level, 
which is equivalent to 1.5 standard deviations of SWB. When we exclude income quartiles its 
value falls to 0.086. This value is in agreement with the result in Table 3 and supports the notion 
that, when income is excluded, the estimates are more conservative. We then compare the 
negative coefficient of 0.102 in the first year of the crisis with the size of other coefficients in 
the same regression in order to put these findings into a broader context.29 Thus, this loss in 
SWB is equivalent to an increase in the unemployment rate by ten percentage points. A move 
from the first to the second income quartile would be required to keep happiness constant 
during the year of the crisis. These examples clearly show that the coefficient is measuring a 
substantial loss in well-being. 
Third, the SWB decline is identified after controlling for individual and macroeconomic 
conditions such as income, job status, GDP, unemployment and the inflation rate. This implies 
that there are non-negligible, non-conventional or hidden costs associated with the banking 
crisis. We discuss the mechanisms that may be responsible for these results in the next Section. 
Fourth, the impact of a banking crisis is highly persistent and is at least twice the length of 
the average GDP drop identified in other studies that look at the effect of banking crisis and 
national income (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a and 2009b). This seems to indicate that 
banking crises have a deep psychological impact that persists even when GDP reverts to its 
28 For completeness, Table A2 in appendix shows the results when UK merchant bank crises are included in the sample (see 
Section 4.2). 
29 Estimated parameters for other coefficients are not shown but are available upon request. 
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initial level.  
Fifth, when we examine the recent financial crisis, we note that the estimated banking crisis 
parameters are roughly half the size and are statistically insignificant. Although this sample 
corresponds to almost one third of the whole period (1980-2001), the same result is found when 
pooling all crises.  
One explanation for this (surprising) result is that we simply have a confounding problem. 
We think that there are two reasons for this. First, only four countries in our database did not 
have a banking crisis, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Luxembourg, and therefore from our control 
group.30 However, Italy and Luxembourg were indirectly affected by the crisis, while Finland 
experienced a different type of financial crisis – a crash of its stock market (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011). Luxembourg’s economy, for example, is heavily reliant on the financial 
industry, since about one quarter of Gross Value Added (GVA) is generated by financial and 
insurance activities.31 Italy was hit by a debt crisis and banks were negatively affected by firms’ 
and households’ solvency and, consequently, had to raise additional cash.32 We interact the 
banking shock variables with the contribution of the financial system to the GVA in each 
country to analyse this situation.33 Results are presented in Table A3 in appendix and show that 
there is no differential effect between countries with different financial sectors.  
A second reason is that financial globalization and the introduction of the euro have led to 
the development of a highly interconnected banking industry. 34 Hence, we do not find a 
significant impact from the 2008 financial crash since all countries in our sample have been hit 
by financial or economic turmoil, from which banking crises are difficult to separate.  
In other words, the fact that our regression does not detect a difference between treatment 
and control group is because it is not possible to clearly identify a control group after the crisis. 
This is corroborated by the plot of the average SWB of treatment and control groups for the 
years around the latest crisis (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Clearly, although statistically 
similar (see Table 3) there is less evidence of a common trend before the crisis; most 
importantly, the drop in SWB is of similar magnitude and occur around the same years. It is 
therefore instructive to focus the analysis of the latest financial crisis on a country by country 
30 Sweden and Norway are not hit by the banking crisis either, however, Eurobarometer surveys were not conducted in those 
years, so they are not included in the control group. See Table 1.  
31 Data from Eurostat on the percentage of financial and insurance activities of the total GVA (at basic prices) for the years 
2007, 2008, 2009 are 28.0%, 25.5%, 25.4%, respectively. 
32 See Messori (2009). 
33 GVA data by sectors were collected from the EUROSTAT database. 
34 Starting from the late 1990s, banks took advantage of cross-border openness to exploit economies of scale. See Claessens et 
al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2011) for a discussion. 
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basis. We do this in the next Section.  
5.3. The 2007-2008 financial crash and SWB 
In the previous sections we have showed that the estimates of the effect of the last financial 
crisis on individuals’ SWB are negative but statistically insignificant; we have already 
discussed one possible explanation for this, which is there are confounding factors at 
macroeconomic level such as banking interconnectedness and sovereign debt crisis, that hinder 
the identification the effect of the banking crisis. In this section, firstly we provide a country by 
country analysis; then we expand our control group of countries and finally we then test further 
hypotheses by looking at differential impacts across countries (triple DD). 
We start by looking at averages of SWB (Table A4) and then move onto running standard 
event studies at country level (Figure 2). Norway, Iceland and Switzerland have been excluded 
from the analysis because some of the key years are missing. The total countries analysed here 
is thus fifteen. Simple averages of life satisfaction for each year from 2003 onwards in the 
countries considered highlight the following patterns: a) there is a substantial decline in SWB 
starting in 2005 up to the onset of the crisis for all the countries considered (treated and 
control); b) the fall is larger between 2005 and the year preceding the crash (ξ-1, either 2007 or 
2008) than in the year of the crash (𝜉0) in more than 50% of the cases ; c) there is evidence of a 
strong and quick recovery in SWB in the vast majority of countries, which may be the result of 
adaptation.  
Figure 2 presents event studies that provide us with a picture of the dynamic of the 
well-being in each country around the years of the latest crisis and helps us to deepen our 
understanding for the lack of a statistically significant difference between treated and control 
groups. The analysis focuses on 8 years, 4 years before and 3 years after the crisis (panel 1). The 
added vertical line indicates the year when the banking crisis started for each country in the 
treatment. With regards to the countries forming the control group (panel 2), we focus on the 8 
years between 2004 to 2011. Each event study is a regression of individual SWB on personal, 
macro controls (inflation, unemployment and GDP) and year fixed effects. These largely 
confirm the descriptive analysis and add additional insights. First, there is a clear decreasing 
trend in wellbeing starting a few years before the banking crisis (in 𝜉−2 or 𝜉−3,) in the majority 
of countries (including countries forming the comparison group).  
Second, contrary to Table A4, and just by looking at the point estimates, the drop is more 
pronounced in year 𝜉0 rather than in the previous years for six countries. Third, the negative 
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effect in year 𝜉0 is statistically significant at least 10% level for six countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Austria, UK and Italy 2008) while it is the year just after the crisis which is 
statistically significantly negative in Spain. Fourth, there is no sign of persistence, but SWB 
fully adapts within at least two years with the exception of Greece, while Italy fully adapted by 
2011. Finally, when looking at the whole 8-year period, the change in SWB is negative and 
statistically significant at 10% level for at least two consecutive years in one third of countries: 
Ireland (from 2006 to 2008), Austria (from 2005 to 2007), Portugal (2008 and 2010) and UK 
(from 2006-2008).  
This country by country analysis is useful in that it clearly highlights how the period 
2005-2008 has been generally characterised by a consistent drop in SWB in the sample of 
countries considered and that it is difficult to pin-point this to a single event, namely, in this 
case, the banking crisis. The evidence seems to suggest that in some countries other macro 
events, perhaps the European debt crisis, have had a bigger impact on individuals’ SWB than 
the banking crisis itself. Investigating this is outside the scope of this paper; further research is 
needed to assess this aspect. 
In order to improve our control group for the latest crisis, we have estimated DD models 
that include Central and Eastern European countries, some of which did not experience a 
banking crisis.35  However, the results do not change substantially as shown by Figure 3 which 
plots the coefficients of the corresponding regression. This Figure compares with panel 3 of 
Figure 1. Including these Eastern and Central European countries in the 2007-8 sample reduces 
the size of each negative coefficient while at the same time moderately improves their 
precision. As a consequence, the negative effect of the Great Recession is now (marginally) 
statistically significant at 10% level for the year after its onset. 
5.3.1. The role of the credit boom and the housing market 
The current financial crisis began during 2007-8 when financial stability replaced inflation as 
central banks’ main concern. The roots of the crisis go back much further, and there are many 
views on the fundamental causes including imprudent mortgage lending, deregulatory 
legislation, credit default swaps, fragmented regulation, and lack of a systemic risk regulator.  
One of the most important and distinctive elements of the current crisis lies in the nature of the 
so-called credit cycle (Kindleberger, 1978 and Minsky, 1982). The term describes the tendency 
35 Following the same dataset by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the Central and East European Countries included in the control 
group are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia; whilst the treatment group now includes Hungary and Slovenia. 
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of the financial system to excessively increase its credit supply during the upswing and to 
strongly cut down lending during recessions (when everybody tries to evade risk).  Several 
authors (e.g., Lindsey, 2007) have documented the similarities between the recent boom–bust 
pattern and earlier episodes. The hypothesis in our context, is that when the credit flow halted, 
individuals living in countries that experienced a credit boom suffered a higher loss than 
countries where the credit market did not expand too rapidly. We proceed by defining a credit 
boom indicator as in the IMF Systemic Banking Crises Database of Laeven and Valencia 
(2013), which follows Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012). It follows from this that countries with a credit 
boom are: Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results are presented in Table 5. We find that the average loss in well-being is much 
more pronounced across those countries which experienced a credit boom, but only in year 
following the crisis, 𝜉+1. 
36 
Although the financial crisis was a widespread phenomenon, the consequent recession 
might have had the most severe impact on those countries that experienced a collapse of the 
housing market.37 In order to investigate this we interact the shock variables with the annual 
rate of growth of house prices in each European country .38 Results in Table 5, clearly show that 
there are not such differential impacts across countries. 
 
5.4. Channels 
We have shown that banking crises generate a loss of well-being that goes beyond that 
generated by changes in individual and macroeconomic factors such as inflation, 
unemployment and GDP. We have also reported studies (Section 2) indicating a variety of 
other more indirect channels though which banking crises affect individuals’ SWB. 
Disentangling the structural relationships between these variables would require a number of ad 
hoc identifying assumptions and a structural model; these go beyond the scope of this work. 
36 This result is robust even after controlling for stock market returns and fiscal variables, such as the tax burden and 
government consumption, which will be introduced in the following section. 
37 The house market may also have been an additional transmission mechanism. We investigate the channels in the next 
sub-section.  
38 Data on annual house prices are collected from the Bank of International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm). 
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Hence, in this sub-section, we build upon that literature to focus on the next effects to shed extra 
light on the type and effect of potential channels through which a banking crisis may affect 
SWB. 
Banking crises are complex financial situations that may result in overall financial and 
economic instability, hence prompting governments to intervene directly. This intervention 
could have some tangible repercussions both on the overall economy and the individuals’ 
SWB. For instance, direct intervention to rescue financial institutions could create fiscal 
constraints for a government that is bound by budgetary regulations. The result could be either 
a decrease in government expenditures and/or an increase in the tax burden. Moreover, if we 
accept the Ricardian equivalence postulate, households may reduce their current consumption 
in the expectation of future increases in taxation. All these factors would have direct and 
indirect impacts on individuals’ income and ultimately on their welfare and well-being.39 
Beyond the fiscal channel, SWB may change via the wealth channel. One of the 
consequences of a banking crisis is turmoil in stock markets; Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b), for 
example, find that equity markets experience an average drop of 55%. This sharp and 
prolonged decline is associated with a loss in wealth, both at the institutional level (e.g., 
pension funds) and the individual level (e.g., savings) and consequently, an individual’s 
SWB.40 
We therefore test the hypothesis of a link between banking crises and SWB that impact the 
individual via government intervention (consumption, level of taxation) and via a wealth effect 
(proxied by a decline in the stock market). We re-estimate equation (4), therefore, in order to 
include government consumption, tax level and stock market returns as additional controls; if 
one of these channels is verified we expect the banking crisis dummy indicator to become 
smaller and to lose statistical significance. 41  
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results, presented in Table 6, clearly indicate that even when these extra variables are 
39 Hessami (2010) presents evidence on the link between government expenditure and SWB. See also Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(2006) 
40 An indirect wealth channel is also taken into account by controlling for inflation. In fact, a higher inflation rate leads to a 
redistribution of wealth between borrowers and lenders. 
41 Government consumption and tax burdens are normalized by GDP. Total tax burden is estimated excluding imputed social 
security contributions and reported as a percentage of GDP at market prices. We take these data from the AMECO database of 
the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm). Data on stock markets is 
computed based on the share price index for each country as provided by the Reuters Thomson Datastream database. 
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included, the coefficients on the banking crisis episodes prior to 2007, remain negative, roughly 
of the same size, and statistically significant.42  
In light of these estimates and the evidence presented above, we suggest that there is a 
fundamental effect of banking crises that is not yet accounted for in our study.43 This hidden 
effect could involve a deep failure of trust, such as trust in financial institutions or trust in 
political/regulatory institutions. This failure could also be a powerful determinant of Knightian 
uncertainty and have a non-negligible impact on an individuals’ level of risk, stress and 
ultimately SWB. 
5.5 Negative growth vs banking crises: a falsification test 
It is reasonable to suspect that the (hidden) effect identified above is the result of deep 
economic recessions coinciding with a banking crisis. To test this hypothesis, we create a 
“placebo” treatment in the form of a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the 
annual economic growth in each country is negative. Equation (4) is then re-estimated using the 
new treatment variable. Our hypothesis is that if the previous results are only guided by general 
economic downturns, then we should expect similar results to those presented in Table 4. If, 
instead, banking crises have distinct psychological costs, we should observe a different pattern. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Columns one to three in Table 7 account for all negative GDP growth years from 1980. 
Some important facts emerge; first, in all specifications, the years before the shock are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that there is no difference in SWB trends between treated 
and control groups. At the beginning of the recession the coefficient is significantly smaller in 
absolute value than the one reported in Table 4. The duration of the impact also appears to be 
different; in the case of a banking crisis, we had a rather persistent effect, while for a recession 
the negative shock evaporates after the end of the first year and turns positive with the third lag. 
The evidence presented in this sub-section is consistent with the presence of psychological 
distress caused by increased uncertainty brought about by the disruption of the banking systems 
and not by other economic crises.  
42 Furthermore, none of the additional control variables included are statistically significant.  
43 One may conjecture that SWB losses could be a consequence of a reduction in health. However reasonable this may appear, 
the bulk of the literature clearly shows that health actually improves when the macro economy worsens (for a recent review see 
Ruhm (2006) or Adda et al., (2009)). 
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5.6. Differences across socio-demographic groups 
The above results indicate that, on average, banking crises have a long and lasting effect on the 
SWB of individuals across Europe in the pre-2007 years. A potential issue with the pooled 
regressions presented above is that they might conceal heterogeneity between groups of 
individuals. It is possible that financial and economic downturns have differential impacts on 
groups of individuals with specific characteristics, and we need to understand these 
distributional costs of a banking crisis. We focus our attention, therefore, on the degree of 
heterogeneity of the response of SWB to a banking crisis across socio-economic groups. We do 
this by interacting leads and lags with individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. In 
particular, we study the effect of a crisis across marital status, gender, income quartiles (this can 
be done only for period 1980-2003) and labour market status. This provides us with a direct test 
of whether a banking crisis affects some groups more than others. This analysis is particularly 
of interest for the latest financial crisis because, even though never statistically significant, the 
sign on the latest financial crash is always negative, indicating perhaps that some categories of 
individuals may have been shielded from the crisis.  
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 8 contains estimates for the early banking crises and for the most recent financial 
event, respectively. We run separate regressions for each set of social or demographic 
indicators: income quartiles (only pre-2003), gender, education and employment status. For 
instance, when studying heterogeneous effects across labour market status we run a regression 
in which the DD parameters are interacted with all labour market status indicators, but not with 
other variables. For clarity, the table shows only the estimates of the triple interaction between 
leads, lags and the individual characteristic of interest. In summary, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that banking crises have a differential impact across groups. When the difference is 
statistically significant, the impact is not persistent over time. This equality of treatments is 
confirmed for the period 1980-2003 and post 2003. The psychological costs of banking crises 
across income groups can be studied only for the episodes prior to 2003. There are no particular 
reasons to believe that, after conditioning on our rich set of characteristics, SWB losses are 
more pronounced for the lower income groups. Our analysis shows that first, second and third 
income quartiles report lower levels of SWB in comparison to the fourth (see the first three 
columns in Table 8). However, the estimates are statistically significant only for the first and 
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second quartiles. When statistically significant, the difference is also large, with lower income 
groups experiencing a loss of SWB of 0.118 (on the 4-point scale) in absolute value. Our results 
also strongly suggest that banking crises do not have a substantially different impact on men 
and women. The analysis does not find strong evidence that unemployed people are more 
affected than employed and retired individuals.44  
That the impact of banking crises is not different across groups may come as a surprise but 
is in line with the idea that a generalised increase in Knightian uncertainty is behind the drop in 
SWB. 
5.7. Heterogeneity across regions 
In this sub-section the possibility of heterogeneity arising across European regions is 
investigated. One meaningful way to look at this is by distinguishing between regions that host 
financial centres (e.g., The Amsterdam region in the Netherlands, London region in UK and so 
forth) and regions that do not. The hypothesis is that financial centres are more likely to be 
impacted by the crash than the rest of the country. The coefficient on the triple difference is 
reported in Table 9 for our four samples. This analysis shows that banking crises hurt more 
individuals living in regions hosting a financial centre than statistically comparable individuals 
living in the rest of the country. This effect is statistically significant for every sample 
considered, including for the latest crisis. For the samples prior to 2007-8, the effect is 0.111 in 
absolute value for the year immediately after the onset of the crash; this is a 1.3 times bigger 
compared to a similar specification (Table 4 column 2).  
The loss of wellbeing is statistically significant also for individuals in financial centres who 
experienced the latest crisis. However there is evidence that the drop started before the crisis 
itself.  
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the impact of banking crises on 
SWB in Europe for the period 1980-2011.  
We do this by combining databases of banking crisis events, compiled by the financial 
44 Working from home and being a student are not shown. Results are available upon request. 
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stability literature over the last two decades and updated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), with 
the Eurobarometer surveys. This allows us to identify sixteen banking crises, five of which 
occurred prior to the latest financial crash. Since the issue of endogeneity can be quite severe, 
this paper utilizes difference-in-differences techniques to address potential bias.  
Overall, our results strongly suggest that financial crises add a non-negligible cost to 
individual well-being, above and beyond that which can be attributed to losses of personal 
income, job and GDP and increasing inflation and unemployment rates. There is some evidence 
that the latest financial crisis hurt more individuals living in regions which host financial 
centres. For the crises before 2007, these hidden costs appear to last for at least three years after 
the crisis and are relatively large. The SWB loss in the first year of the crisis is equivalent to an 
increase in the unemployment rate of 10 percentage points. A change in income equivalent to 
moving somebody from the first to the second income quartile is required to hold SWB 
constant in the first year of the crisis.  
For the great recession of 2007-8, we find that the loss in SWB is considerable for those 
individuals living in countries which had previously experienced a credit boom. Moreover, 
using an event study, we find a negative trend in SWB for the majority of the countries starting 
about three years before the crisis. We are reluctant to call this an anticipatory effect, but we 
find this an interesting observation which calls for further research. 
Furthermore, we do not detect any differential impacts across socio-economic groups, 
suggesting that all individuals appear to be equally affected by the crisis.  
Finally, we argued that the loss in SWB above and beyond that generated by GDP and 
unemployment could be absorbed when a fiscal channel (e.g., government intervention) and a 
wealth channel are taken into consideration. When such tests are implemented, the 
psychological loss is still present. 
The results presented in this paper suggest that some fundamental effects of banking crises 
are not accounted for in the standard literature on the costs of the crises. We suggest that these 
neglected effects include a deep failure of trust, such as trust in financial institutions or trust in 
political/regulatory institutions. This is certainly a stimulating topic, which deserves further 
research. Unfortunately, surveys on trust at European level are either very sporadic (The World 
Value Surveys include European countries but there are considerable gaps between successive 
waves) or began too late (The European Social Surveys start in 2001-2003, while the 
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Eurobarometer includes questions on trust in European Institutions from 1999 only). 45 Future 
research needs to focus on other World regions. This failure of trust could also be a powerful 
determinant of Knightian uncertainty (i.e., unquantifiable uncertainty, as described, for 
instance, by Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008), hence our definition of this as a hidden cost 
which, we found, has a non-negligible impact on individuals’ level of risk, stress and 
consequently, on individuals’ SWB.  
  
45 Ehrmann et al. (2013) analyse how trust in the European Central Bank (and other European Insitutions) evolved around the 
great recession of 2007-8 and show that there is a decline across European countries. 
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Figure 1. Pre-treatments and persistence  
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Note: Each plot summarises regression results from Table 4. Each dots represent the estimated effect of banking 
crisis on SWB with respect to the beginning of the banking crisis. 90% of confidence level are reported. The 
beginning of the banking crises is normalised at year 0. On the horizontal axis, the labels: -1, -2,…(+1, +2, …) 
represent the number of years leading to (following) the starting date of the banking crisis. They correspond to 
parameters 𝜉−4 through 𝜉+4 in equation (4). There are four plots corresponding to the four columns (samples) of 
Table 4. 
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Figure 2. 2007-8 financial crisis – event studies at country level 
(1) Countries that experienced the banking crisis 
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(2) Countries that did not experience the banking crisis 
  
  
Note: Each plot summarises separate regression results by country. For the countries at the top panel, each dot 
represents the estimated effect of the latest 2007-2008 banking crisis on SWB with respect to the beginning of the 
banking crisis, which vary between 2007 and 2008 depending on the country. The added vertical line indicates 
when the crisis started. 90% confidence intervals are reported. For Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden which 
are depicted in the second panel and did not experienced a banking crisis, the graphs plot the value of the 
estimated year fixed effect. Norway, Iceland and Switzerland have been excluded from the analysis because some 
of the key years are missing. 
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Figure 3. The effect of the 2007-8 financial crisis on SWB when the sample includes Central and Eastern 
European countries 
 
 
Note: This Figure compares with panel 3 of Figure 1, the only difference being the inclusion of Central and 
Eastern European countries. Each dot represents the estimated effect of banking crisis on SWB with respect to the 
beginning of the banking crisis. 90% confidence interval based on two-way clustered standard errors at country 
and year level are reported. The beginning of the banking crises is normalised at year 0. On the horizontal axis, the 
labels: -1, -2,…(+1, +2, …) represent the number of years leading to (following) the starting date of the banking 
crisis. They correspond to parameters 𝜉−4 through 𝜉+2 in equation (4).  
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Table 1. Treatment group of countries and year 𝝃𝟎 of the banking crisis 
Before the 2007-8 financial crisis 2007-8 financial crisis 
(1980-2003) (2003-2011) 
 
Denmark, 1987 
 
Denmark, 2008 
Greece, 1991 Greece, 2008 
France, 1994 France, 2008 
UK, 1991 UK, 2007 
Italy, 1990  
 Ireland, 2007 
 Germany, 2008 
 The Netherlands, 2008 
 Austria, 2007 
 Portugal, 2007 
 Belgium, 2008 
 Spain, 2008 
 
Notes: The table portrays episodes for which we have life satisfaction data for the first year of the crisis. There are 
five episodes for which we have life satisfaction data around the starting of the banking crisis, but not for year 𝝃𝟎 
(see equation (4)) because Eurobarometer surveys were discontinuous in those countries. They are Norway 1987, 
Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, Iceland, 2007 and Switzerland, 2007. In particular, for Finland and Sweden, surveys 
are available only for year 𝝃+𝟒, while for Norway only for 𝝃+𝟑 and 𝝃+𝟒. For Iceland, Eurobarometer surveys are 
available only for year 𝝃+𝟑 and 𝝃+𝟒, and year 𝝃−𝟐,, while for Switzerland, the only Eurobarometer survey is 
conducted 3 years before its crisis (𝝃−𝟑). 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Before the 2007-8 financial crisis 
(1980-2003) 
 
2007-8 Financial crisis 
(2003-2011) 
 
Mean St Dev 
 
Mean St Dev 
Life satisfaction 3.05 0.77  3.13 0.76 
Occupational status:      
Unemployed 0.07 0.25  0.06 0.24 
Self-employed 0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27 
Retired 0.20 0.40  0.27 0.44 
House keeping 0.15 0.36  0.09 0.29 
Student 0.06 0.24  0.08 0.26 
Military 0.01 0.02  - - 
Income:      
First income quartile 0.25 0.43  - - 
Second income quartile 0.25 0.43  - - 
Third income quartile 0.25 0.43  - - 
Fourth income quartile 0.25 0.43  - - 
Marital status:      
Married 0.63 0.48  0.62 0.49 
Single 0.23 0.42  0.21 0.41 
Divorced/separated 0.06 0.23  0.08 0.27 
Widowed 0.08 0.28  0.09 0.28 
Female 0.51 0.50  0.53 0.50 
Age 44.11 17.80  48.42 18.14 
Education:     
No full-time education 0.01 0.14  0.01 0.08 
Still in full-time education 0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27 
Up to 14 years 0.26 0.44  0.16 0.37 
15 years 0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27 
16 years 0.12 0.32  0.10 0.30 
17 years 0.07 0.26  0.07 0.25 
18 years 0.11 0.31  0.13 0.33 
19 years 0.05 0.23  0.07 0.25 
20 years 0.04 0.21  0.05 0.22 
21 years 0.03 0.18  0.04 0.21 
22 years or older 0.14 0.35  0.22 0.41 
Macroeconomic controls      
Inflation  0.05 0.05  0.02 0.01 
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.04  0.08 0.03 
Log of GDP  10.09 0.25  10.37 0.20 
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Table 3. Basic OLS happiness regressions 
 Before the 2007-8 financial crisis 
(1980-2003) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 
(2003-2011) 
 All period  
(1980-2011) 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Banking crisis (𝜉0) -0.073** -0.056**  -0.007  -0.033 
 (0.032) (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
       
Quartiles of income  Yes No  No  No 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  459,799 633,687  315,877  933,943 
R-squared  0.188 0.164  0.237  0.186 
 
Notes: Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, 
inflation and unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age 
and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status 
dummy variables. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level as 
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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Table 4. The causal effect of banking crises on SWB; lagged and anticipatory effects 
 
Before the 2007-8 financial 
crisis 
(1980-2003) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 
(2003-2011) 
 All period  
(1980-2011) 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
-4 years -0.015 -0.025  -0.016  -0.007 
 (0.028) (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.016) 
-3 years -0.043 -0.047  -0.026  -0.021 
 (0.036) (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.021) 
-2 years -0.012 -0.009  -0.032  -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.029) 
-1 year -0.023 -0.033  -0.025  -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.024)  (0.049)  (0.038) 
Banking crisis (𝜉0) -0.102** -0.086**  -0.051  -0.049 
 (0.046) (0.038)  (0.050)  (0.043) 
+1 year -0.096** -0.070  -0.079  -0.058 
 (0.048) (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.051) 
+2 years -0.074*** -0.066***  -0.034  -0.033 
 (0.026) (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.041) 
+3 years -0.052** -0.068*    -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.035)    (0.037) 
+4 years -0.049 -0.044**    0.014 
 (0.034) (0.022)    (0.030) 
       
Quartiles of income Yes No  No  No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations 459,799 633,687  315,877  933,943 
R-squared 0.188 0.164  0.237  0.186 
 
Notes: Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, inflation 
and unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and age-squared, 
indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. 
Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level as proposed by Cameron et al. 
(2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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 Table 5. The causal effect of the 2007-8 financial crisis on SWB following the credit boom episodes and 
different house price growth 
Interaction with event years 𝜉𝑛 
Credit 
boom 
(1) 
House 
price 
(2) 
     
(credit boom) (-4 years) 0.011  
 (0.056)  
(credit boom) (-3 years) -0.012  
 (0.042)  
(credit boom) (-2 years) 0.003  
 (0.047)  
(credit boom) (-1 year) -0.045  
 (0.051)  
(credit boom) (Banking crisis) -0.034  
 (0.037)  
(credit boom) (+1 year) -0.110*  
 (0.065)  
(credit boom) (+2 years) -0.056  
 (0.063)  
(house price growth) (-4 years)  -0.004 
  (0.006) 
(house price growth) (-3 years)  -0.003 
  (0.004) 
(house price growth) (-2 years)  0.000 
  (0.005) 
(house price growth) (-1 year)  -0.007 
  (0.007) 
(house price growth) (Banking crisis)  -0.007 
  (0.005) 
(house price growth) (+1 year)  -0.006 
  (0.007) 
(house price growth) (+2 years)  0.001 
  (0.005) 
   
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes 
Observations 315,877 292,486 
R-squared 0.237 0.237 
 
Notes: This table shows the estimated interaction terms from two separate regressions. The first 
column is a regression in which the banking crisis leads and lags are interacted with  the credit 
boom indicator, while the second column presents interactions with house price growth. Data on 
credit boom episodes are from Laeven and Valencia (2013) (see also Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012), 
while data on house prices are from the Bank of International Settlements 
(http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm).  Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used 
in the literature: log of GDP, inflation and unemployment rate at country level. Individual 
characteristics include gender, age and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a 
complete set of employment status dummy variables. Standard errors adjusted for two-way 
clustering at country and year level as proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 
𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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Table 6. Channels 
 Before the 2007-8 financial crisis 
 
2007-8 financial crisis 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
-4 years -0.007 -0.008 0.023 0.018 
 
-0.008 -0.022 -0.025 -0.027* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016) 
-3 years -0.030 -0.030 -0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.018 -0.034 -0.033* -0.036 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) (0.050) 
 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) 
-2 years -0.002 -0.002 -0.046** -0.050** 
 
-0.026 -0.040 -0.041 -0.047 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.019) (0.022) 
 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031) 
-1 year -0.008 -0.008 0.012 0.004 
 
-0.023 -0.028 -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.042) (0.051) 
 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.043) (0.040) 
Banking crisis (𝜉0) -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.059** -0.069** 
 
-0.049 -0.055 -0.049 -0.052 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045) 
+1 year -0.081** -0.081** -0.089** -0.089** 
 
-0.082 -0.083 -0.063 -0.071 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) 
+2 years -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.062*** -0.069*** 
 
-0.037 -0.037 -0.043 -0.050 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) 
 
(0.052) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) 
+3 years -0.059** -0.059** -0.053* -0.055** 
 
    
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) 
 
    
+4 years -0.063* -0.064* -0.047* -0.055* 
 
    
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.027) (0.029) 
 
    
     
 
    
Government consumption Yes No No Yes 
 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Tax burden No Yes No Yes 
 
No No Yes Yes 
Annual stock market returns No No Yes Yes 
 
No No No Yes 
Quartiles of income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
    
Observations 314,160 422,455 393,600 377,532 
 
315,877 315,877 314,160 314,160 
R-squared 0.236 0.196 0.194 0.199 
 
0.237 0.237 0.236 0.236 
Notes: Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, inflation and unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age 
and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level 
as proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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Table 7. The causal effect of negative growth on SWB 
 Before the 2007-8 Financial crisis (1980-2003) 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-4 years 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) 
-3 years 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.011 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
-2 years 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
-1 year -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Negative growth (𝜉0) -0.037 -0.046 -0.046 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.022) 
+1 year -0.055 -0.073* -0.074* -0.076** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.041) (0.031) 
+2 years 0.003 0.008 0.008 -0.026 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
+3 years 0.047** 0.045* 0.045* 0.037 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
+4 years 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) 
     
     
Annual stock returns No No No Yes 
Tax burden No No Yes Yes 
Government consumption No Yes Yes Yes 
Quartiles of income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 459,799 422,455 422,455 377,532 
R-squared 0.189 0.197 0.197 0.200 
 
Notes: Negative growth is when a country experienced a year of negative GDP growth.  
Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, inflation 
and unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and 
age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status 
dummy variables. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level as 
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
 
44 
 
Table 8. Heterogeneity of the effect of banking crises on SWB  
 
Before the 2007-8 Financial crisis 
(1980-2003) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 
 Income quartiles (Ref cat. Fourth) 
 
 Gender 
 
 Employment status (Ref. cat: employed) 
 
 Gender   Employment status (Ref. cat: employed) 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 First  Second Third  Female  Unemployed Self-employed Retired   Female  Unemployed Self-employed Retired 
                
-4 years -0.014 0.026 0.019*  -0.003  -0.008 -0.037 0.069  -0.020  0.033 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.057) (0.020) (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.067) (0.041) (0.047)  (0.022)  (0.065) (0.025) (0.026) 
-3 years 0.012 0.043 0.013  0.014  0.035 0.035 0.090**  -0.014  -0.050 -0.041* -0.025 
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.104) (0.047) (0.039)  (0.020)  (0.070) (0.024) (0.032) 
-2 years -0.055* -0.011 -0.037*  -0.012  0.032 0.096** 0.030  -0.009  -0.021 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.012) (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.052) (0.046) (0.043)  (0.020)  (0.065) (0.029) (0.022) 
-1 year -0.003 -0.024 0.001  -0.004  0.054 -0.008 0.029  -0.019  0.007 -0.014 -0.049* 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.032)  (0.060) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.066) (0.031) (0.029) 
Banking crisis (𝜉0) -0.006 -0.118** -0.035  -0.005  0.138** -0.082 0.025  -0.038**  0.005 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.067) (0.055) (0.052)  (0.019)  (0.064) (0.024) (0.034) 
+1 year -0.118** 0.012 -0.039  -0.013  0.046 -0.039 -0.014  -0.008  -0.109* -0.052 -0.022 
 
(0.046) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.076) (0.035) (0.054)  (0.018)  (0.062) (0.058) (0.027) 
+ 2 years -0.011 -0.013 0.017  -0.008  0.040 -0.033 0.056  -0.022  -.089 -0.028 -0.029 
 
(0.042) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.062) (0.046) (0.036)  (0.027)  (0.082) (0.052) (0.052) 
+3 years -0.034 0.033 -0.027  -0.008  0.030 -0.056* 0.015       
 
(0.055) (0.023) (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.075) (0.031) (0.034)       
+4 years 0.001 0.026 0.021  -0.049  0.088 -0.004 0.023       
 
(0.071) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.045)  (0.083) (0.025) (0.032)       
                
Quartiles of income Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No  No No No 
Observations  422,455   422,455   422,455   315,877   315,877  
R-squared  0.196   0.196   0.197   0.237   0.238  
Notes: The table shows estimates from four separate regressions in which banking crisis lags and leads are interacted with marital status, gender, income quartiles and employment 
status indicators, respectively.  Every panel shows the triple interaction term from these separate regressions. The last columns show only selected employment status indicators. 
Macroeconomic controls include log of GDP, inflation, unemployment rate and government consumption. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level as 
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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Table 9. The effect of banking crises on SWB in regions with financial centres 
 
Before the 2007-8 financial 
crisis 
(1980-2003) 
 2007-8 financial crisis 
 (2003-2011) 
 All period  
(1980-2011) 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2)   (3)  (4) 
(financial centre) (-4 years) 0.019 0.017  -0.036  -0.024 
 (0.072) (0.078)  (0.029)  (0.038) 
(financial centre)(-3 years) -0.055 -0.028  -0.062**  -0.064** 
 (0.073) (0.065)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
(financial centre)(-2 years) -0.055 -0.037  -0.041*  -0.046*** 
 (0.034) (0.034)  (0.024)  (0.017) 
(financial centre)(-1 year) 0.015 0.035  -0.035*  -0.018 
 (0.042) (0.045)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
(financial centre)(Banking crisis) -0.036 0.005  -0.061***  -0.050** 
 (0.044) (0.047)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
(financial centre)(+1 year) -0.112*** -0.111***  -0.063**  -0.087*** 
 (0.035) (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
(financial centre)(+2 years) -0.062 -0.035  -0.087***  -0.082** 
 (0.052) (0.053)  (0.025)  (0.034) 
(financial centre)(+3 years) -0.067 -0.088    -0.101*** 
 (0.052) (0.059)    (0.032) 
(financial centre)(+4 years) -0.041 0.006    -0.015 
 (0.049) (0.072)    (0.041) 
       
Quartiles of income Yes No  No  No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations 403,380 555,594  312,277  852,885 
R-squared 0.198 0.173  0.235  0.194 
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the financial centre indicator 
and the banking crisis leads and lags only. Macroeconomic controls include log of GDP, inflation, 
unemployment rate and government consumption. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country 
and year level as proposed by Cameron et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. 
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 Online Appendix (not for publication) 
Table A1: A Summary of near systemic banking crises by events across our sample of 18 European countries, 
1980-2011 
Country Brief Summary 
Year 
𝝃𝟎 
Sources 
Belgium 2007-8 Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Denmark Two small banks collapsed and shook the 
banking system leading to moves to curb 
bank lending. Cumulative losses over 
1990–92 were 9% of loans; 40 of 60 problem 
banks were merged. 
1987 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo et al. (2001); 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
 2007-8Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Germany 2007-8 Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Greece Localized problems required significant 
injections of public funds 
1991 Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart (2002), Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Spain 2007-8  Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
France Crédit Lyonnaise had serious solvency 
problems 
1994 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Ireland 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011);  
Italy Fifty-eight banks, with 11 percent of lending, 
merged with other institutions 
1990 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
The Netherlands 2007-8 Financial crisis 2008 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Austria 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Portugal 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
UK The Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International failed 
1991 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011) 
 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007  
Norway* Two regional saving banks failed. The banks 
were eventually merged and bailed out. The 
Central Bank provided special loans to six 
banks suffering from the recession of 
1985–86 and from problem real estate loans. 
The state took control of the three largest 
banks with 85% of banking system assets. 
1987 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Sweden* The Swedish government rescued 
Nordbanken, the second largest bank. 
Nordbanken and Gota Bank, accounting for 
1991 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002); Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. (2001); Reinhart and 
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22 percent of banking system assets, were 
insolvent. Sparbanken Foresta, accounting 
for 24 percent of banking system assets, 
intervened. Overall, five of the six largest 
banks, accounting for more than 70 percent 
of banking system assets, experienced 
difficulties. 
Rogoff (2011) 
Finland* A large bank (Skopbank) collapsed on 
September 19 and was intervened. Savings 
banks were badly affected; the government 
took control of three banks that together 
accounted for 31 percent of system deposits. 
1991 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002); Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. (2001); Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011) 
Iceland* 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Switzerland* 2007-8 Financial crisis 2007 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Note: * Eurobarometer surveys are not administered every year in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. As 
a result, life satisfaction data for the 5 countries at the bottom of this table cannot be merged with the date of the beginning 
of the crisis for those episodes. Instead of dropping those observations, when running the dynamic DD model, we use 
information on life satisfaction data as leads or lags if surveys were conducted in years leading to or following the financial 
crisis. In particular, for Finland and Sweden, surveys are available only for year 𝜉+4, while for Norway only for 𝜉+3 and 
𝜉+4. For Iceland, Eurobarometer surveys are available only for year 𝜉+3 and 𝜉+4, and year 𝜉−2,, while for Switzerland, the 
only Eurobarometer survey is conducted 3 years before its crisis (𝜉−3).  
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Table A2. The causal effect of banking crises on SWB – All banking crisis 
 Before the 2007-8 financial crisis (1980-2003) 
 All period  
(1980-2011) 
Event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2)  (3) 
-4 years -0.018 -0.010  -0.015 
 (0.018) (0.015)  (0.014) 
-3 years -0.045 -0.048  -0.028 
 (0.029) (0.028)  (0.017) 
-2 years -0.003 -0.005  -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.021) 
-1 year -0.022 -0.016  -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.027) 
Banking crisis (𝜉0) -0.063* -0.075*  -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.042)  (0.036) 
+1 year -0.056 -0.065  -0.053 
 (0.048) (0.056)  (0.049) 
+2 years -0.051 -0.059*  -0.030 
 (0.030) (0.028)  (0.036) 
+3 years -0.044 -0.037  -0.011 
 (0.041) (0.030)  (0.029) 
+4 years -0.040*** -0.033*  -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.018)  (0.019) 
     
     
Quartiles of income No Yes  No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes  Yes 
     
Observations 459,799 422,455  422,455 
R-squared 0.189 0.197  0.197 
 
Notes: Standard errors cluster at country level. In parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1.  
Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, inflation and 
unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and age-squared, 
indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. 
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 Table A3. The causal effect of the 2007-8 banking crisis in countries with different financial structures  
 
    
Interaction with event years 𝜉𝑛 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
(financial structure) (-4 years) 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) 
(financial structure) (-3 years) -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
(financial structure) (-2 years) -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
(financial structure) (-1 year) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
(financial structure) (Banking crisis) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
(financial structure) (+1 year) 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) 
(financial structure) (+2 years) 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
  
  
Annual stock returns No No No Yes 
Tax burden No No Yes Yes 
Government consumption No Yes Yes Yes 
Quartiles of income No No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 295,802 295,802 295,802 294,085 
R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.244 
 
Notes: This table shows the interaction terms of banking crisis indicators with the size of the financial sector 
(relative to each country Gross Value Added, GVA). Data on GVA by sector were drawn from the 
EUROSTAT database. Macroeconomic controls are the standard controls used in the literature: log of GDP, 
inflation and unemployment rate at country level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and 
age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy 
variables. Standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at country and year level as proposed by Cameron 
et al. (2011) in parentheses, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, * 𝑝 ≤ 0.1.   
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Table A4: Evolution of SWB during the 2007-8 crisis 
  Panel A: Average annual SWB by country 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Belgium 3.04 3.25 3.25 3.19 3.18 3.12 3.21 3.20 3.25 
Denmark 3.57 3.57 3.69 3.61 3.63 3.61 3.70 3.69 3.64 
Germany 2.76 3.02 3.03 2.90 2.97 2.94 3.03 3.05 3.09 
Greece 2.67 2.78 2.77 2.71 2.68 2.57 2.43 2.34 2.38 
Spain 3.02 3.14 3.13 3.10 3.06 2.99 2.90 2.97 2.93 
Finland 3.15 3.33 3.38 3.25 3.26 3.27 3.36 3.35 3.31 
France 2.85 3.05 3.04 2.99 2.96 2.90 2.98 3.00 3.02 
Ireland 3.16 3.36 3.38 3.28 3.23 3.22 3.29 3.28 3.29 
Italy 2.86 2.92 2.85 2.87 2.79 2.62 2.70 2.76 2.85 
Luxembourg 3.25 3.47 3.54 3.38 3.39 3.34 3.39 3.40 3.42 
The Netherlands 3.29 3.46 3.48 3.39 3.44 3.47 3.48 3.47 3.47 
Austria 3.08 3.14 3.16 3.05 3.05 2.98 3.04 3.12 3.07 
Portugal 2.50 2.64 2.53 2.50 2.52 2.41 2.42 2.34 2.44 
Sweden 3.29 3.42 3.51 3.43 3.41 3.45 3.49 3.49 3.47 
UK 3.19 3.32 3.29 3.21 3.22 3.19 3.32 3.33 3.30 
           
  Panel B: Average annual change in SWB by country 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Belgium  7% 0% -2% 0% -2% 3% 0% 2% 
Denmark  0% 3% -2% 0% 0% 2% 0% -1% 
Germany  10% 0% -4% 3% -1% 3% 1% 2% 
Greece  4% 0% -2% -1% -4% -5% -4% 2% 
Spain  4% 0% -1% -1% -2% -3% 2% -1% 
Finland  6% 1% -4% 0% 0% 3% 0% -1% 
France  7% -1% -1% -1% -2% 3% 1% 1% 
Ireland  6% 1% -3% -1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
Italy  2% -2% 1% -3% -6% 3% 2% 3% 
Luxembourg  7% 2% -4% 0% -1% 1% 0% 1% 
The Netherlands  5% 0% -2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Austria  2% 1% -4% 0% -2% 2% 3% -2% 
Portugal  5% -4% -1% 1% -4% 0% -3% 4% 
Sweden  4% 3% -2% -1% 1% 1% 0% -1% 
UK  4% -1% -2% 0% -1% 4% 0% -1% 
Notes: Results in panel A are obtained by averaging the SWB across all individuals within a given country and year.  
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland have been excluded from the analysis because some of the key years are missing. 
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Figure A1 Sample average life satisfaction around the 2007-2008 financial crisis between treatment vs. control 
countries 
 
Note: Treatment countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, The 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden form the control group 
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